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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict

Defendant of burglary and theft. When reviewing a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial, the appellate court
applies the "clearly erroneous" standard, "which requires that 'if
the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a criminal case) are
3

against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside.'"
Featherson,
Walker,

State

781 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989) (quoting State

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987))/ Provo

861 P.2 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

City

Corp.

v.

v.

v.

Spotts,

The appellate court will not

disturb the findings unless they are clearly erroneous."
Featherson,

781 P.2d at 432 (citing Lemon v. Coates,

60 (Utah 1987)).

735 P.2d 58,

In addition, the appellate court gives due regard

to the opportunity of the "trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (made applicable to criminal
cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(7)).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, and cases whose interpretation is determinative, are
set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and
arguments of the instant brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Stephen P. Murphy and Grant Dion Barnes, as co-defendant, were
initially charged by way of information filed on June 26, 1996,
with burglary, failure to respond to officer's signal to stop,
aggravated assault, theft, possession of burglary tools, and
driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license.

On June 26,

1996, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel and pleaded
4

not guilty to burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-202, theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, and possession of burglary tools, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205. On
October 3, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel
for bench trial. After trial, the court convicted Defendant of
burglary and theft and acquitted Defendant of possession of
burglary tools. At the same time, the trial court sentenced
Defendant to two indeterminate terms of zero to five years in the
Utah State Prison for burglary and theft, in addition to two $5,000
fines and restitution as determined by the parole board.

On

December 4, 1996, the trial court signed its Judgment, which was
entered on December 12, 1996. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on
January 10, 1997.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In June 1996, Stephen P. Murphy had been a contract

laborer for Mesa Moving & Storage Company located in North Salt
Lake for approximately three or four years (Bench Trial Transcript,
R. 93, lines 2-5) . * As a contract laborer, Mr. Murphy loaded and
unloaded moving trucks (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 6-7);
2.

Mr. Murphy would find out when and where he was to work

by calling dispatch at the Mesa Moving & Storage Company and

X

A1 though Mr. Murphy had been working for Mesa Moving & Storage
Company for approximately three to four years, he had been working in
the moving business for approximately eleven years (Bench Trial
Transcript, R. 93, lines 11-14).
5

speaking with Mr. Robert Albertoni, who would then make the
necessary arrangements for work (Bench Trial Transcript,

93,

lines 8-11) /
3.

On Tuesday, June 22, 1996,

:

-^s visiting

Defendant, with whom Mr. Murphy had been friends for approximately
eleven years (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94). 2 While visiting with
Defendant, Mr. Murphy had car problems and needed money for parts
to his car prior to returning to Provo (Bench Trial Transcript, R,
94, lines 7-11);
4.

As a result, Mr. Murphy, later that night, decided to go

to Mesa Moving & Storage Company to leave a note for Mr. Albertoni
to inform him of his whereabouts so that work could be arranged the
next day (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94i.
Mr

MIII pi ly

(Bench Trial Transcript,

Defendant accompanied
m e s 22-2.

lines 11-12) ;
.. 5.

After a r r :i v:i i ig at Me s a Mo^ 'i i Ig & S t:o i: age Compai I;:; 1 1 :i :

Murphy attempted to get the attention of an employee who was
inside the building to give him a note for Mr. Albertoni (Bench
Trial Transcript,
6.

3-6);

In the course of attempting to get the employee's

attentioi i, 1: In : I ii n: pi i;y sai ; a v ending machine and cl lange machine
located on a forty-eight foot flat-bed trailer outside the bay

Murphy "had just found out that [Defendant] had been out of
. . ." (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93-94).
6

doors on the loading dock (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 95, lines 714/ R. 96, lines 16-20);
7.

Mr. Murphy, himself, then picked up the vending together

with the coin changer, which was located on top of the vending
machine (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96), and loaded the units into
the back of his car, which was a hatchback (Bench Trial Transcript,
R. 97; R. 11-12);
8.

As Mr. Murphy began to leave, the employee, who had been

working inside the building, came out of the building and saw Mr.
Murphy's car leaving at a high rate of speed (Bench Trial
Transcript, R. 97, 61; R. 75-76);
9.

Mr. Murphy ran a stop sign (Bench Trial Transcript, R.

97, lines 11-12).

A police officer for the city of North Salt

Lake, Craig Beckstrand, attempted to stop Mr. Murphy after seeing
Mr. Murphy run the stop sign (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 64-65);
10.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Murphy attempted to explain why

he was not stopping (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 20-23) .
Defendant, a parolee, wanted out of the car and stated "Let me out
of here, this isn't where I need to be right now" (Bench Trial
Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 23-25; R. 109, lines 23-24);
11.

Officer Beckstrand chased Mr. Murphy onto the freeway

towards Salt Lake City (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 65-67).

Mr.

Murphy refused to stop his vehicle until confronted some time later
by Salt Lake City Police Officers in Salt Lake City proper (Bench
Trial Transcript, R. 69-70);

7

12.

Throughout the chase, Defendant complained to Mr. Murphy

about not stopping and tried to exit the vehicle, all the while
urging Mr. Murphy to stop (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 98-99);
13.

Shortly before Defendant came to a complete stop,

Defendant jumped out of the vehicle and was apprehended by the
police (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 98, lines 2-14);
14.

After the stop and subsequent arrest of Mr. Murphy and

Defendant, the police retrieved a screwdriver and crowbar from the
back seat of the Mr. Muryphy's car (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 70,
lines 7-12);
15.

Out of the back of Mr. Murphy's car, Officer Beckstrand,

without assistance,3 retrieved a vending machine and coin changer,
which was attached to the vending machine by a steel cable (Bench
Trial Transcript, R. 70-73; R. 75, lines 7-14);
16.

Stephen P. Murphy and Grant Dion Barnes, as co-defendant,

were initially charged, as parties, by way of information filed on
June 26, 1996, with burglary, failure to respond to an officer's
signal to stop, aggravated assault, theft, possession of burglary
tools, and driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license
(Information, R. 8-11) ;
17.

On June 26, 1996, Defendant appeared for arraignment with

appointed trial counsel and pleaded not guilty to burglary, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, theft, a

3

At trial, Officer Beckstrand testified that the vending machine
and coin changing machine weighted approximately "30 to 50 pounds
total" (R. 72, lines 2-6).

8

third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, and
possession of burglary tools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (Minute Entry - Notice, R. 13-14);
18.

On October 3, 1997, Defendant appeared with his co-

defendant, Stephen P. Murphy, for trial (Bench Trial Transcript, R.
49).

Prior to trial, however, Mr. Murphy pleaded guilty to the

failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop and theft, with
the remaining counts being dismissed (Bench Trial Transcript, R.
50-59);
19.

At trial, Mr. Murphy testified that Defendant did not

assist in the theft of the vending machine and coin changing
machine (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96-97; R. 110, lines 8-10) .
Mr. Murphy further testified that Defendant knew nothing of the
theft (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94-95) until Mr. Murphy explained
it to him in the course of the chase from North Salt Lake to Salt
Lake City proper (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 2325);
20.

In the course of investigating the alleged burglary,

Officer Arnold was informed by the other officers at the scene that
"they found that the side door [of Mesa Moving & Storage Company]
had been pried and that the lock was broken on it" (Bench Trial
Transcript, R. 81, lines 4-6);
21.

Officer Arnold testified at trial that, while there were

photographs of the side door, he did not have any photographs of

9

the alleged pry marks because

lf

[t]hey didn't turn out very well.

They were over-exposed" (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 7-13)/
22.

Officer Arnold further testified to the following

concerning the pry marks:
MR. COLE: Now, have you had experience in the
past with looking at pry marks?
OFFICER ARNOLD:

Yes, I have.

MR. COLE: Based on that experience, did you
try to match [the pry marks] with State's
Exhibit No. 10 which was found in the vehicle
driven by Defendant Murphy and in which Mr.
Barnes was passenger?
OFFICER ARNOLD: In just looking, it looks like
that it has been pried against a painted
surface, which that is a painted surface.
MR. COLD: Okay. Was it possible to do more
scientific tests on that?
OFFICER ARNOLD: No.
•

*

*

*

MR. COLE: I'd like to call your attention to
the end of the pry bar at that time. Would you
tell me what you see on the end of that
photograph?
OFFICER ARNOLD: It looks like some paint or
some white at the — a t the very end of it.
MR. COLE: Did you have an opportunity to
compare that with the paint at the scene?
OFFICER ARNOLD:
color paint.
MR. COLE:

Did you check for fingerprints?

OFFICER ARNOLD:
MR. COLE:

It appears to be the same

I did.

What did you find?
10

OFFICER ARNOLD: I wasn't able to come up with
any fingerprints.
MR. COLE: And what exactly did you test?
OFFICER ARNOLD: The door — the inside of the
door and the outside of the door and the frame
area.
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 81-83);
23.

On cross-examination, Officer Arnold testified that he

did not check either the candy vending machine or coin changer for
fingerprints (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 17-21);
24.

At trial, the owner of the vending machine and coin

changer testified that the vending machine and coin changer, with
product and money, would weigh approximately "between 50 and 70
pounds, I would think roughly . . .

[p]robably about 80 pounds"

(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 88, lines 18-25);
25.

The owner also testified that, while being very awkward

and difficult, it is possible to move the "units" by yourself
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 89, lines 6-12);4
26.

Shortly after closing arguments that same day, the trial

court convicted Defendant of burglary and theft and acquitted
Defendant of the charge of possession of burglary tools (Bench
Trial Transcript, R. 132/ Minute Entry, R. 27-28/ Judgment, R. 3031);

4

The owner testified that the vending machine sits on top of a
table, is about two and one-half feet tall, and is approximately two
and one-half to three feet wide (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 90-91) .

11

27.

The trial court signed the Judgment on December 4, 1996,

which was entered on December 12, 1996 (Judgment, R. 30-31);
28.

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on January 10, 1997 (R.

32-34) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the

conviction of defendant for burglary and theft inasmuch as the
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence presented at
trial.

The evidence at trial establishes that the State failed to

prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is required to
do.

A review of the evidence supporting the burglary and theft

convictions leads one to the logical conclusion that Defendant's
convictions are based on conjecture or supposition, which does not
amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary
and theft, as set forth above pursuant to the marshaling
requirement, is viewed is a light most favorable to the trial
court's verdict, it is insufficient to support Defendant's
conviction of burglary and theft inasmuch as it leads to a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court.
Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore appropriate
in the instant case.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT FOR BURGLARY AND THEFT

12

INASMUCH AS THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a
bench trial, the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous"
standard, "which requires that fif the findings (or the trial
court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the
findings (or verdict) will be set aside.f"

State

781 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
191, 193 (Utah 1987)); Provo City
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Corp.

v.

Featherson,

v. Walker,

v. Spotts,

743 P.2d

861 P.2 437

The appellate court will not disturb the

findings unless they are clearly erroneous."
at 432 (citing Lemon v. Coates,

Featherson,

781 P.2d

735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987)).

In

addition, the appellate court gives due regard to the opportunity
of the "trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (made applicable to criminal cases by virtue
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(7)).
As a matter of well-settled law, "circumstantial evidence
alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused."
State

v. Nickles,

728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986).

Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient to convict "if it is of *such quality and
quantity as to justify a [a determination of] guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.'" State

v. Span,

13

819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991)

(quoting Nickles,

728 P.2d at 127) . When the evidence consists

solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence:
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to
determine (1) whether there is any evidence
that supports each and every element of the
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences
that can be drawn from that evidence have a
basis in logic and reasonable human experience
sufficient to prove each legal element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty
verdict is not legally valid if it is based
solely on inferences that give rise to only
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt*
State

v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993).
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a

"Md]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
insufficient.'"

State

v Hayes,

860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App.

1993) (quoting State

v. Vigil,

1992), cert,

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)).

denied,

840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah Ct. App.
In the instant

case, Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the
verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then persuade
the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the State
failed to prove that he was a was guilty of burglary and theft.
See State

v. Scheel,

823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

"Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or supposition;
they must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."

See

Workman, 852 P.2d at 987 (noting that the State's argument that
"speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable
14

doubt is to attack one of the most sacred constitutional safeguards
at its core").
As set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-2 02, "A person is guilty
of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person," According to Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404, "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to
deprive him thereof."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 defines criminal

liability as a party to a crime as follows:

"Every person, acting

with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as
a party for such conduct."

In other words, "[o]ne may be convicted

as an accomplice if, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of the offense, he or she ^solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense.'"

State

v. Webb, 790 P.2d

65, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202).
The following is the marshaled evidence that supports the
trial court's verdict that Defendant was a party to burglary and
theft of the vending machine and coin charger:

(1) On the night of

June 22, 1996, Defendant accompanied Mr. Murphy to Mesa Moving &
Storage Company to leave a note for Mr. Albertoni, the contact

15

person, to inform him of Mr. Murphy's whereabouts so that work
could be arranged for Mr. Murphy the next day to get money for
parts to Mr. Murphy's car (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 2223/ R. 94); (2) The testimony at trial that the vending machine and
coin changer, which was connected to the vending machine by a steel
cable, would be "awkward to carry by yourself" (Bench Trial
Transcript, R. 72, lines 7-8; R. 73, lines 9-12; and R. 74, lines
8-11; R. 89); (3) Defendant's statement to Mr. Murphy shortly after
the chase began, "Let me out of here, this isn't where I need to be
right now" (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 23-25; R.
109, lines 23-24); (4) Shortly before Defendant came to a complete
stop, Defendant jumped out of the vehicle and was apprehended by
the police (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 98, lines 2-14); and (5)
After the stop and subsequent arrest of Mr. Murphy and Defendant,
the police retrieved a screwdriver and crowbar from the back seat
of Mr. Murphy's car (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 70, lines 7-12).
Even when the aforementioned evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court's verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support Defendant's convictions of burglary and
theft.

Notwithstanding the awkwardness, the uncontroverted

testimony of Officer Beckstrand at trial was that the vending
machine and coin changer could be lifted by oneself (Bench Trial
Transcript, R. 70-73; R. 75, lines 7-14) . In fact, the owner
testified that, while being very awkward and difficult, it is
possible to move the "units" by yourself (Bench Trial Transcript,

16

R. 89, lines 6-12).

The inference that Mr. Murphy could and did

lift the vending machine and coin changer by himself and put it in
the back of his car is especially reasonable in light of the
undisputed evidence that Mr. Murphy, at the time of trial, had
worked loading and unloading moving trucks for approximately eleven
years (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 11-14).
Further, there is no physical evidence, whatsoever, connecting
Defendant, to the alleged burglary or theft.

Officer Arnold, who

investigated the burglary, testified at trial that he didn't get
photographs of the alleged pry marks because
out very well.
7-13).

lf

[t]hey didn't turn

They were over-exposed" (Bench Trial Transcript, R.

Later, when asked if he had matched the pry marks at the

scene with the crowbar found in the backseat of Mr. Murphy's car,
Officer Arnold evasively and nonresponsively testified that "[i]n
just looking, it looks like that it has been pried against a
painted surface, which that is a painted surface", and that it was
not possible to do tests on that (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 81,
lines 21-25/ see also

R. 82-83, nonresponsive answer by Officer

Arnold that "[i]t appears to be the same color paint" to the almost
unbelievable question of whether he compared the paint in the
picture of the pry bar with the paint at the scene).

In addition,

Officer Arnold testified that he found no fingerprints after
checking both the inside and outside of the door frame as well as
the door (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 83, lines 7-14).

In fact,

Officer Arnold did not check either the vending machine or the coin

17

changer for fingerprints

(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 83, lines 17-

21) .
The State presented no evidence, whatsoever, that Defendant,
was a party to the burglary and theft, or that he acted with the
same mental state as the person who entered or remained unlawfully
in the building and solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided the person in entering or unlawfully remaining
in the building with intent to commit theft.

Rather, Mr. Murphy

testified that Defendant incontrovertibly testified that Defendant
did not assist in the theft of the vending machine and coin changer
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96-97; R. 110, lines 8-10).

Mr. Murphy

further testified that Defendant knew nothing of the theft

(Bench

Trial Transcript, R. 94-95) until Mr. Murphy explained it to him in
the course of the chase from North Salt Lake to Salt Lake City
proper

(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 97, lines 14-16, 23-25) .

As is established by the foregoing evidence at trial, the
State failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it
is required to do.

5

See

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. 5

A review of

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "elements
of the offense" mean:
(a)
The
conduct,
attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense; or
(b)
The
culpable
mental
state

18

the evidence supporting the burglary and theft convictions leads
one to the logical conclusion that Defendant's convictions are
based on conjecture or supposition, which does not amount to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary
and theft, as set forth above pursuant to the marshaling
requirement, is viewed is a light most favorable to the trial
court's verdict, it is insufficient to support Defendant's
conviction of burglary and theft inasmuch as it leads to a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial court.
Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore appropriate
in the instant case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court reverse his convictions of burglary and theft and remand for
a new trial or further proceedings consistent with this Court's
directions as stated in its opinion.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
issues in the instant appeal dealing with insufficiency of evidence
for burglary and theft, which are matters of continuing public

required.
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interest and which, based on the facts of the instant appeal,
involve issues requiring further development in the area of
criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and public.
Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value
and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2fctl) day of June, 1997.
' }LD & WIGGINS, L.C.

Attorneys rer Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 126p)
day of June, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHRISTINE SOLTIS
CRIMINAL APPEALS DIVISION
P.O. Box 14S354
S a l t L a k e / c i t \ UT 84114-0854
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Addenda A: Judgment

MELVIN C. WILSON 3513
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 4 51-4 300

fcc

^

3 33 /iff -96

n t r- .

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT?''^!
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT ](

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 961700488

vs .
GRANT DION BARNES,

Hon. Glen R. Dawson, Judge

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the 3rd
day of October, 1996, the defendant being present in person and
represented

by

his

attorney,

Glen

T.

Cella,

the

State

being

represented by David M. Cole, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson, Judge,
presiding.
The defendant having been convicted upon a finding of
guilty of the offenses of Burglary, and Theft, both third degree
felonies, and the Court having asked if the defendant had anything
to say why judgment should not be pronounced; and no sufficient
cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court;
IT

IS ADJUDGED

that

the defendant

is guilty of

the

offenses of Burglary and Theft, both third degree felonies, as
charged and convicted.

JU0QMENT ENTEHEO
-v

^

„r»

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of
zero to five years on each count, and is fined $5,000 on each
count, and ordered to pay restitution as determined by the parole
board, as provided by law.

Parties notified of judgment in open

court.
Pursuant to Judgment and Commitment executed by the Court
on the 3rd day of October, 1996, the defendant has been transported
to the Utah State Prison.
DATED this

c

day of

tko-W-

, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

^dl^fctV

JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
Delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment
this
<^*^ day of November, 1996, to Glen T. Cella, Attorney for
Defendant.
J~^ <<^r \-^r>v->

